In this article, Phillip Muñoz suggests how we can read the religious free exercise and establishment clauses in light of the Constitution’s original design and purposes, being situated properly in a tradition of natural law and rights.
We know that the free speech clause of the First Amendment protects us from government censorship. But suppose someone raises the question, “What’s the point of freedom of speech?” To provide an answer, you cannot simply appeal to the Constitution, since the questioner is asking you to justify what is in the Constitution. You must enter the realm of philosophical argument …
By offering a voluntary prayer, the government introduces its students to religion in a way that is not coercive or intrusive. It is, rather, a traditional acknowledgement of religion, even if it simply constitutes a recognition of the theistic origins of our unalienable rights.
Prof. Francis Beckwith makes the argument for re-opening the question of school prayers in the courts, explaining how this would enable local governments to seek the common good.
